And what of the environmentalists who argued that some people commit crimes because of the environment in which they were raised? It was the same conceptualization of man. Both were equally mechanical. Both were equally modern. And, for both, by what means do we come to know the nature of man? Through reason. It is reason, not faith, revelation, tradition, or individual will that is supreme.
Does the HBD concept not contain the same materialist assumptions about the nature of man? Does it, with its abstract and statistical methods not claim the supremacy of reason? For many readers and contributors to Alternative Right, this is not a problem. Paul Gottfried, for example, looks back to an ideal of nineteenth-century liberalism, an ideal built upon the supremacy of reason and a mechanical view of man and the cosmos. So, should someone like Gottfried have any interest in statistical conceptualizations and rankings of race, it would not conflict with his metaphysical foundations. Might we then identify a split within the “traditionalists” of Alternative Right? Is there a split between paleocons, with their modernism and nineteenth-century liberalism, and, if I may, archaeocons, who are groping towards a rejection of modernity?
So then how are opponents of modernity to understand human difference? Is there a non-modern conceptualization we can apply to modern racial classifications? I don’t think so. Race is entirely modern. Race, which emerged as an idea in the seventeenth century, requires an abstract and universalistic view of man, by which we float above a single thing called man and divide him into categories based on rational analysis. In contrast, traditional views of human difference emerged organically from the concrete and local experience of individuals. No universal system of classification was necessary. An individual in Gaul would have understood difference according to his personal needs and experiences, which may have differed greatly from those of an individual in Carthage or a Pict. Indeed, two individuals of differing stations or regions of Gaul may have conceived of human difference differently. And all of these conceptions could have lived along with one another without any pressure to reconcile them in some universal and abstract manner.
I question, however, whether or not diverse organic and concrete conceptualizations of man are possible today. Human difference, like all else, has been subordinated to industrialization and the modern state. The modern state demands uniformity of definitions, universalism, and abstraction so that it might manage the populations over which it rules. Both the HBD concept and liberal views of man as equal – the same – both fulfill this demand. Both are modern. Neither are traditional.







